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Do you know where to invest your money? That is a million-dollar question. The answer will be different for each people. First you need to know your risk profile. Some people don’t like risk, and some don’t mind having some risk. This risk profile will determine where to put your money. If you like risk, then you can invest in riskier asset. Remember that the riskier it is, the higher return you will get. So if you don’t like taking risk, do not expect to get 20% a year return.

The most common place for people to invest money are stocks, bonds, mutual funds, real estate, gold, or starting their own business. Every investment has their own characteristic. It is your job to know the characteristic and match it with your risk profile.

Bond, real estate, and some kind of mutual funds generally have lower risk than other investment. Their return will be lower and it has little fluctuation. On the other hand stocks, option, forex or starting your own business is very risky. With stocks you can loss money in minutes. Do you know how much money you could lose when mortgage crisis happened in 2008? 50% drop in a year is so common that days. How about starting your own business? Guess what. It is riskier than investing in stock, especially if you do not have the skill to manage it.

If you know nothing about investing you need to get help soon. The easiest way is to invest in mutual fund. A mutual fund is a professionally managed type of collective investment. Although it is professionally managed, it does not means that you will not lose money. When economy in crisis, you will most likely lose your money too. The best fund manager beat the market. For example, when the market drop 5%, they will only drop 3%. And when the market rally 5%, they will make you 6% richer.

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There are two main types of financing for a business, debt or equity financing. Debt financing tends to be the type of financing you receive from a traditional bank loan and equity financing tends to be financing you receive from venture capital into your business from outside investors. The benefit of debt financing is that it is finite and you will pay down the debt over time to a zero sum balance without any further obligation to the lender. The down stroke to debt financing is that traditional lenders will take a hard look at your business including how long it has been in existence, income from operation, expenses and will require hard assets for collateral for the loan. Additionally, lenders will most certainly want you (and any other principals of the organization) to personally guarantee repayments of the loan. Another disadvantage of debt financing is that your organization will be burdened with some other type of regular payment (usually a monthly payment) depending on the terms and conditions of the financing and this can absorb critical cash flow, especially with small business.

The benefit of equity financing or venture capital is that you will be receiving money in exchange for equity in your business in the form of stock or some other form of equity like percentage of income or gross/net sales. A primary benefit of this type of financing is that typically there is no monthly payment requirement to investors. Instead, you are giving up ownership interest, most often, permanently.

Traditional lenders, banks for example, will look at your business much differently than venture capitalist. Bankers want a zero-risk or near-zero risk position when they provide financing and will rely almost completely on the operating economics of the business with little regard for “potential future growth”. They want to see strong cash flow backed up by hard assets before they do a deal–the ingredients that most small business lack or they wouldn’t be seeking financing, right? Venture capitalist, on the other hand, tend to consider the management team and the potential future growth of the business more heavily than actual operating numbers, especially for small business with large potential but few sales and little or no operating history. Although these two lender types vary in their approach to analyzing a business for funding, you can be sure that careful scrutiny of you business will be conducted…

Besides the actual operating economics and pro forma analysis, both types of lenders will look closely at two particular documents: 1. Your business plan. 2. Your bank or loan request package. These two documents, if assembled correctly, can make the difference between success and failure when dealing with either lender type.

There are plenty of free SBA related materials that tell you how to create blue-chip, boiler plate business plans but they tend to be written for perfect businesses and not the average Joe who is less than picture perfect. If you are seeking some type of financing for your business I strongly suggest that you visit our site and check out our business e-books. We have several that cover a variety of topics and there are specifically two that will be a real treasure for you to own. One is called Power Planning (a powerful report on writing a wide variety of business plans) and How To Raise Money For You Business (teaches you how to assemble professional loan requests packages). They are priced at $5 each and can be worth millions in the hands of the right person. I am not trying to hype product, I am simply giving you a heads up.

The secrets to getting financing from either type of lender is a closely held secret by financial and business brokers for a number of reasons. Chief among them is it forces people like you to do business with them and they earn commissions. The SBA materials, while good, do not have the street savvy to get the job done in most cases. The proof is in the pudding–what has the SBA ever done for you? The SBA is just another government back bureaucratic nightmare for most. We also have some links for venture capital firms in our business links area located on our site on the Smart Link Zone page–it’s all-free.

Give it some thought…. Your future may depend on it.

To your success! Copyright © 2006 James W. Hart, IV All Rights reserved

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Investing money in 2011 and 2012 puts the investor between a rock and a hard place as investing has become more difficult. Investing in stocks has gained favor vs. bonds in recent months. What’s going on, how should you invest, and why do I say investing has become difficult?

The stock market just about doubled in value between early 2009 and early 2011, and investing money in stocks (equities) and selling bonds appeared to be the new trend in investing for 2011. Does this mean that investors are confident that the U.S. economy is well and getting better? Not necessarily. More than likely it means that investing in equities appears to be the lesser of two evils. Bonds and bond funds have a cloud hanging over their head. Interest rates could start rising significantly in 2011 or in 2012 and this spells trouble for anyone investing in bonds.

There are very few statements you can make in the world of investing money that are universally accepted as fact. One of them is this: when interest rates go up, bond prices (values) go down. In simple terms, the fixed interest payments that these securities pay become less attractive to investors as rates go up. So, many investors will sell their bonds… sending prices down… and put their money someplace else. Since the government had been holding interest rates down for months to stimulate the economy, rates are likely to go up in 2011 or 2012, if the government stops this policy as planned. Investing money in bonds will then be a loosing proposition if rates rise significantly. That’s a fact and about as black and white as investing gets.

Stock investing is more of a gray area. High and rising interest rates can slash corporate profits and this tends to send stock prices down. But in early 2011 rates might have been rising, but they certainly were not high by historical standards. Corporate profits were strong and investors dumped bonds and switched to stocks. The other major alternative for investing money was safe investments like one-year CDs and money market funds. With both of them paying less than 1% a year, there was little reason for the average investor to invest in either. The only real advantage in safe investments at these low interest rates is safety and liquidity.

In other words, none of the three basic investment areas where most people invest look very attractive. That’s what makes investing money in 2011 and going forward difficult. If interest rates continue to climb bonds are guaranteed losers and stocks will eventually get hit. Safe investments might not look attractive when they start paying at 1% or 2%, but they will at 3%, and that’s where folks will put there money.

So, how should most people invest money for 2011-2012? Cut your exposure to bonds and avoid long-term bonds and funds that invest in them. Long-term bonds and funds will get hurt the most if rates rise significantly. Go with intermediate or shorter term bond funds. Move some money into money market funds. They are safe and the interest they earn will automatically go up with rising interest rates. Investing money in stocks or equity funds should remain a part of your overall strategy, but avoid aggressive growth issues or growth funds that don’t pay significant dividends. Look for dividend yields of at least 2% in high quality stocks or equity funds. Growth stocks are often hardest hit when corporate profits fall.

Diversification and balance are your keys to success when investing money in 2011-2012. There are times you can invest aggressively, and there are times when a more cautious approach is called for. With interest rate hikes looming over the markets, this is not the time to throw caution to the wind. 

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Imagine that the best funds for 2011 might not be the best bond funds or stock funds from 2010, but rather funds that you might not even be aware of. Now imagine taking control of your investment portfolio so that you can relax in retirement. Times are changing and it’s time to think outside the box and diversify like never before.

Don’t expect to find the best funds for 2011 if you are looking in the wrong places. Bond funds have been good investments in recent times, but even the best bond funds could be running out of gas soon. Interest rates have fallen like a rock and can’t get much lower. When rates head back up virtually all traditional bond funds will be losers. Higher interest rates means lower bond prices or values. That’s the way it works.

General diversified stock funds are at the mercy of a stock market that can’t seem to get traction in a sluggish economy with high unemployment. But some of the best funds for 2011 could be stock funds that specialize in specific sectors. For example: mutual funds in the gold mining, energy, or commercial real estate sectors. Other opportunities could take the form of exchange traded funds (ETFs) rather than mutual funds. The big advantage here is the wide variety of investment options to help you diversify your investment portfolio even further.

Diversification is the key to investing in uncertain times. Think: How might I get hurt in the future with my investment portfolio, and how can I diversify to protect myself and profit at the same time. For example, inflation and interest rates and/or energy prices could go higher. Inflation-protected bond funds, gold, energy (natural resources), and real estate funds might be good investment options to add to your portfolio. All four of these come in the form of both mutual funds and exchange traded funds.

To fine tune or diversify your investment portfolio even further the best funds for 2011 are exchange traded funds. There are over a thousand to choose from and they trade as stocks on the major exchanges. Open an account with a major discount broker and you’re in business. Plus, you will have access to investment tools; and information on these funds will be at your fingertips. Now you can bet that interest rates will go up by simply buying shares in stock symbol TBT, or that natural gas prices will rise by buying UNG. You can buy or sell on any business day in a matter of seconds for a commission of $10.

Average investors today have all of the investment options they will ever need to succeed in the form of funds. Traditional bond funds and general diversified stock funds should remain as major components of the average investment portfolio, but in times of high uncertainty greater diversification is called for. Your best funds to accomplish this are those that invest in areas that can buck the trend when the going gets tough.

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Internal rate of return is commonly known as IRR by those in the

financial industry. To understand internal rate of return, you must

first know what is NPV or net present value. IRR is discounted rate

of return derived based on the condition that net present value for

an investment is 0. IRR is then compared to the company’s discounted

rate of return. If IRR is higher than the company’s / project’s discounted

rate of returns, then the investment is deemed to be worthwhile for the company or investor.

The discounted rate of return for the company is determined

by the investors themselves. Discounted rate of return is derived

based on a number of factors. One of them is the consideration of

risk. If the investor is evaluating a more risky investment, he is

likely to have a higher rate of return. This is to compensate the risk

that he is taking on this project. Another factor that could influence

the discounted rate of return is the general market rate of return.

To calculate the internal rate of return manually (without a

financial calculator) is a very laborious process. It will take

you minutes if not hours. However, using Excel, you can do it in

less than a minute. Assuming that the cash flows (from year 0 to

year 5) is in the range “D$3:J$3″, the formula to derive the IRR

is “=IRR(D$3:J$3)” without quotes.

Now that we have learnt how to calculate the internal

rate of return, it is important to know that IRR can only be

used under certain conditions. The best way to determine if the

IRR can be used is to plot the NPV of the investment against

the discount rate of return. If the NPV crosses the X-axis more

than once, i.e. NPV is zero more than once, than the investment

is considered to have multiple internal rate of return and should

be used with caution.

It is very safe to use IRR only when the cash inflow or outflow only

changes once. This means that you can have a series of outflow

before the inflow comes in. Once the inflow kicks in, outflow cannot

be present again. Alternatively, you could have a series of inflow

first followed by a series of outflow, but inflow of funds cannot

appear again. If there are multiple IRR, then it would be difficult

to determine which IRR to use.

If there are changes in the cash flows from negative to

positive and back again to negative, the chances of this

investment having multiple internal rate of return is very

high.

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The best time to plan your best investment strategy and pick the best funds for 2012 is now, because last year’s investment strategy and best funds could put you in the poor house by year end 2012. There’s a rocky road ahead for stocks and bonds, and you’ll need a new strategy and the right funds to keep your investment portfolio balanced and out of serious trouble.

For the average investor the best investment strategy will still revolve around bond funds and stock funds in 2012, but the focus will change. The best bond funds will be more defensive, and the best stock funds will be more conservative and income oriented. The USA and much of the free world is facing heavy debt problems on the one hand and slow economic growth one the other. Defense is the name of the game going forward. If you can sidestep heavy losses now and throughout 2012: you will be in a position to step up to the plate when the dust finally settles.

The best bond fund investment strategy is to hold SHORTER-TERM high quality CORPORATE bond funds – and NOT long-term funds that invest primarily in government securities. If interest rates take off long term bonds will fall substantially in value. A mutual fund holding issues that mature in about 5 years will be hurt much less than one that holds long term maturities of 20+ years. That’s not a guess. That’s how the bond market reacts to rising interest rates. I suggest going with corporate vs. government bond funds for two reasons. First, corporate bond issues pay higher interest than U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. Second, corporate America is in excellent financial shape vs. the U.S. government.

The best investment strategy in the stock department is to avoid or sell equity (stock) funds that invest heavily in growth and/or small-company stocks. These often pay little or no dividend income to investors, and in a volatile and declining stock market these funds can get clobbered. The best stock funds for 2012 will be EQIUTY INCOME large-cap funds that invest in high-quality major corporations with excellent records for paying above average dividend yields. A 2% to 3% dividend income might not make you rich, but a steady reliable income stream from America’s highest quality companies tends to cushion portfolio losses in a bad stock market.

Over the past several years I have included owning gold, gold stocks and gold funds as part of my recommended best investment strategy. For 2012 I no longer include gold in my investment strategy, primarily because gold’s price has become extremely inflated over the past few years. Gold has become more of a speculation than a hedge against inflation or disaster. Instead of holding gold I would suggest putting some of your investment dollars in an insured account at your local bank. Sometimes cash is king, especially when interest rates are extremely low and rising. Money market funds are the best funds for safety. When rates move up they should become quite attractive as a safe haven for investors.

Both the best stock funds and best bond funds for 2012 will be defensive in nature. They will also have something else in common… a low cost of investing. Keeping costs low is always an ingredient in the best investment strategy for average investors. Invest in low-cost no-load INDEX funds whenever possible to automatically increase your total returns by 1%, 2% or more year in and year out. That might not sound like much, unless you consider that you haven’t been able to earn 2% in safe liquid investments for the past few years.

In summary, your best investment strategy for 2012 and going forward: an even split between relatively short-term corporate bond funds and high quality large-cap equity- income funds. The best bond funds and best stock funds in these categories will be low cost no-load (no sales charges) INDEX funds with low yearly expense ratios. The best safe investments may be found by shopping local banks or credit unions until interest rates really take off. After that the best safe investment will likely be money market mutual funds.

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Consider this a wake-up call if you assume the best mutual funds for 2011 and years to come will again be bond funds vs. stock funds. Millions of people own these funds and many are wondering which are the best funds to own in these times of high uncertainty. Here we make comparisons and discuss some things you may never have thought about.

With the year 2011 approaching a trend in mutual funds became very clear. Investors were pulling money out of stock funds and scurrying to the perceived safety of bond funds. The reason: bond funds had a good track record, while stock funds had beaten investors up big time…TWICE in the “lost decade” from 2000 to 2010. Going forward it could be a big mistake to assume that the best mutual funds for 2011 and beyond will again be those that invest in fixed-income securities called bonds. Let’s take a look at the nature of both types of funds.

Bond funds are often labeled as INCOME funds because their objective is to earn relatively high interest income for their investors by investing in fixed-income securities. Their second objective is conservation of principal or price stability of fund shares (safety). Stock funds are often called EQUITY funds because they invest your money in equities (stocks) in pursuit of higher total returns… with a higher degree of risk. You make money here when stock prices go up, and secondarily from dividend income. Most people have learned that the value or price of their equity funds will fluctuate, going both up and down. Many haven’t learned that bond fund values fluctuate as well, even though they have an OBJECTIVE of relative price stability.

Few folks pay close attention to their mutual funds, but most know whether they are making or losing money. For example, few would know how or why they made a total return of 10% for the year in a bond fund when it only paid 3% or 4% in dividend (interest) income. Where did the rest of the profits come from? Very simply, the price of their fund shares went up over the year as interest rates in the economy fell. This has been the basic trend for years as interest rates have fallen to historical lows. As a result of falling rates the fixed-income securities in bond fund portfolios have become more attractive to investors in general – who have bid bond prices up to higher and higher levels in the open market.

In the bond funds vs. stock funds debate you could say that the former are more predictable. If the economy remains lackluster and interest rates continue to fall, bond funds could well be the best mutual funds for 2011 and in future years. On the other hand, these funds are even more predictable on the down side. If interest rates go up significantly virtually all bonds in existence will become less attractive and lose value. So will the funds that invest in them. This is one of the only iron-clad rules in investing. Another is that every investment has risk… and there is considerable risk for the unsuspecting investor in income funds when interest rates are at or near historical lows. Plus, there is little upside profit potential left. After all, how much further can interest rates fall?

Equity funds, like the stock market, have always been unpredictable from year to year. That’s why these funds are required to warn investors about the risks involved when investing in them. On the other hand, over the long term they have produced profits (returns) on average of about 10% a year vs. 5% to 6% returns for income funds. Some years they have produced returns of 30%, 40% or more for investors. Another advantage is the wide variety of equity funds available to average investors: general diversified funds, international, emerging markets, and specialty funds that specialize in the gold, real estate, and natural resources sectors to name a few. Not all equity funds tank when the U.S. stock market gets knocked for a loop.

In the best mutual funds for 2011 debate of bond funds vs. stock funds here are my final thoughts for you. The average investor should invest in both. You can do this and cut your overall risk if you do the following. Avoid long-term income funds because they are very sensitive to higher interest rates. Go with intermediate-term funds for less risk. In the equity funds department diversify like crazy by including international and specialty funds in your portfolio. General diversified equity funds should be your primary holdings, but mix it up a bit. Funds that specialize in the likes of gold, real estate, and oil stocks can sometimes buck the trend in a lousy stock market.

You don’t need to find the best mutual funds for 2011 and beyond in either category to be successful. You need the best collection of bond funds and stock funds that will bring your overall portfolio risk to a level you can live with.

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This article presents a case study of sustained entrepreneurial growth of Kingdom Financial Holdings. It is one of the entrepreneurial banks which survived the financial crisis that started in Zimbabwe in 2003. The bank was established in 1994 by four entrepreneurial young bankers. It has grown substantially over the years. The case examines the origins, growth and expansion of the bank. It concludes by summarizing lessons or principles that can be derived from this case that maybe applicable to entrepreneurs.

Profile of an Entrepreneur: Nigel Chanakira

Nigel Chanakira was raised in the Highfield suburb of Harare in an entrepreneurial family. His father and uncle operated a public transport company Modern Express and later diversified into retail shops. Nigel’s father later exited the family business. He bought out one of the shops and expanded it. During school holidays young Nigel, as the first born, would work in the shops. His parents, particularly his mother, insisted that he acquire an education first.

On completion of high school, Nigel failed to enter dental or medical school, which were his first passions. In fact his grades could only qualify him for the Bachelor of Arts degree programme at the University of Zimbabwe. However, he “sweet-talked his way into a transfer” to the Bachelor in Economics degree programme. Academically he worked hard, exploiting his strong competitive character that was developed during his sporting days. Nigel rigorously applied himself to his academic pursuits and passed his studies with excellent grades, which opened the door to employment as an economist with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ).

During his stint with the Reserve Bank, his economic mindset indicated to him that wealth creation was happening in the banking sector therefore he determined to understand banking and financial markets. While employed at RBZ, he read for a Master’s degree in Financial Economics and Financial Markets as preparation for his debut into banking. At the Reserve Bank under Dr Moyana, he was part of the research team that put together the policy framework for the liberalization of the financial services within the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. Being at the right place at the right time, he became aware of the opportunities which were opening up. Nigel exploited his position to identify the most profitable banking institution to work for as preparation for his future. He headed to Bard Discount House and worked for five years under Charles Gurney.

A short while later the two black executives at Bard, Nick Vingirayi and Gibson Muringai, left to form Intermarket Discount House. Their departure inspired the young Nigel. If these two could establish a banking institution of their own so could he, given time. The departure also created an opportunity for him to rise to fill the vacancy. This gave the aspiring banker critical managerial experience. Subsequently he became a director for Bard Investment Services where he gained critical experience in portfolio management, client relationships and dealing within the dealing department. While there he met Franky Kufa, a young dealer who was making waves, who would later become a key co-entrepreneur with him.

Despite his professional business engagement his father enrolled Nigel in the Barclays Bank “Start Your Own Business” Programme. However what really made an impact on the young entrepreneur was the Empretec Entrepreneur Training programme (May 1994), to which he was introduced by Mrs Tsitsi Masiyiwa. The course demonstrated that he had the requisite entrepreneurial competences.

Nigel talked Charles Gurney into an attempted management buy-out of Bard from Anglo -American. This failed and the increasingly frustrated aspiring entrepreneur considered employment opportunities with Nick Vingirai’s Intermarket and Never Mhlanga’s National Discount House which was on the verge of being formed – hoping to join as a shareholder since he was acquainted with the promoters. He was denied this opportunity.

Being frustrated at Bard and having been denied entry into the club by pioneers, he resigned in October 1994 with the encouragement of Mrs Masiyiwa to pursue his entrepreneurial dream.

The Dream

Inspired by the messages of his pastor, Rev. Tom Deuschle, and frustrated at his inability to participate in the church’s massive building project, Nigel sought a way of generating huge financial resources. During a time of prayer he claims that he had a divine encounter where he obtained a mandate from God to start Kingdom Bank. He visited his pastor and told him of this encounter and the subsequent desire to start a bank. The godly pastor was amazed at the 26 year old with “big spectacles and wearing tennis shoes” who wanted to start a bank. The pastor prayed before counselling the young man. Having been convinced of the genuineness of Nigel’s dream, the pastor did something unusual. He asked him to give a testimony to the congregation of how God was leading him to start a bank. Though timid, the young man complied. That experience was a powerful vote of confidence from the godly pastor. It demonstrates the power of mentors to build a protégé.

Nigel teamed up with young Franky Kufa. Nigel Chanakira left Bard at the position of Chief Economist. They would build their own entrepreneurial venture. Their idea was to identify players who had specific competences and would each be able to generate financial resources from his activity. Their vision was to create a one – stop financial institution offering a discount house, an asset management company and a merchant bank. Nigel used his Empretec model to develop a business plan for their venture. They headhunted Solomon Mugavazi, a stockbroker from Edwards and Company and B. R. Purohit, a corporate banker from Stanbic. Kufa would provide money market expertise while Nigel provided income from government bond dealings as well as overall supervision of the team.

Each of the budding partners brought in an equal portion of the Z$120,000 as start-up capital. Nigel talked to his wife and they sold their recently acquired Eastlea home and vehicles to raise the equivalent of US$17,000 as their initial capital. Nigel, his wife and three kids headed back to Highfield to live in with his parents. The partners established Garmony Investments which started trading as an unregistered financial institution. The entrepreneurs agreed not to draw a salary in their first year of operations as a bootstrapping strategy.

Mugavazi introduced and recommended Lysias Sibanda, a chartered accountant, to join the team. Nigel was initially reluctant as each person had to bring in an earning capacity and it was not clear how an accountant would generate revenue at start up in a financial institution. Nigel initially retained a 26% share which assured him a blocking vote as well as giving him the position of controlling shareholder.

Nigel credits the Success Motivation Institute (SMI) course “The Dynamics of Successful Management” as the lethal weapon that enabled him to acquire managerial competences. Initially he insisted that all his key executives undertake this training programme.

Birth of the Kingdom

Kingdom Securities P/L commenced operations in November 1994 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Garmony Investments (Pvt) Ltd. It traded as a broker on both money and stock markets.

On 24th February 1995 Kingdom Securities Holding was born with the following subsidiaries: Kingdom Securities Ltd, Kingdom Stockbrokers (Pvt) Ltd and Kingdom Asset Managers (Pvt) Ltd. The flagship Kingdom Securities Ltd was registered as a Discount House under Banking Act Chapter 188 on 25th July 1995. Kingdom Stockbrokers was registered with the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange under ZSE Chapter 195 on 1st August 1995. The pre-licensing trading had generated good revenue but they still had a 20% deficit of the required capital. Most institutional investors turned them down as they were a greenfield company promoted by people perceived to be “too young”. At this stage National Merchant Bank, Intermarket and others were on the market raising equity and these were run by seasoned and mature promoters. However Rachel Kupara, then MD for Zimnat, believed in the young entrepreneurs and took up the first equity portion for Zimnat at 5%.

Norman Sachikonye, then Financial Director and Investments Manager at First Mutual followed suit, taking up an equity share of 15%. These two institutional investors were inducted as shareholders of Kingdom Securities Holdings on 1st August 1995. Garmony Investments ceased operations and reversed itself into Kingdom Securities on 31st July 1995, thereby becoming an 80% shareholder.

The first year of operations was marked by intense competition as well as discrimination against new financial institutions by public organisations. All the other operating units performed well except for the corporate finance department with Kingdom Securities, led by Purohit. This monetary loss, differing spiritual and ethical values led to the forced departure of Purohit as an executive director and shareholder on 31st December 1995. From then the Kingdom started to grow exponentially.

Structural Growth

Nigel and his team pursued an aggressive growth strategy with the intention of increasing market share, profitability, and geographic spread while developing a strong brand. The growth strategy was built around a business philosophy of simplifying financial services and making them easily accessible to the general public. An IT strategy that created a low cost delivery channel exploiting ATMs and POS while providing a platform that was ready for Internet and web-based applications, was espoused.

On 1st April 1997, Kingdom Financial Services was licensed as an accepting house focusing on trading and distributing foreign currency, treasury activities, corporate finance, investment banking and advisory services. It was formed under the leadership of Victor Chando with the intention of becoming the merchant banking arm of the Group. In 1998, Kingdom Merchant Bank (KMB) was licensed and it took over the assets and liabilities of Kingdom Securities Limited. Its main focus was treasury related products, off-balance sheet finance, foreign currency and trade finance. Kingdom Research Institute was established as a support service to the other units.

The entrepreneurial bankers, cognisant of their limitations, sought to achieve critical mass quickly by actively seeking capital injection from equity investors. The aim was to broaden ownership while lending strategic support in areas of mutual interest. An attempt at equity uptake from Global Emerging Markets from London failed. However in 1997 the efforts of the bankers were rewarded when the following organisations took up some equity, reducing the shareholding of executive directors as shown below: ïEUR Ipcorn 0.7%, ïEUR Zambezi Fund Mauritius P/L 1.1%, ïEUR Zambezi Fund P/L 0.7%. ïEUR Kingdom Employee Share Trust 5%, ïEUR Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund – 8% redeemable preference shares amounting to US$1,5m as the first investee company in Southern Africa from the US Fund initiated by US President Bill Clinton, ïEUR Weiland Investments, a company belonging to Mr Richard Muirimi, a long standing friend of Nigel and associate in the fund management business took up 1.7%, Garmony Investments 71.7% -executive directors. ïEUR After a rights issue Zimnat fell to 4.8% while FML went down to 14.3%.

In 1998, Kingdom launched four Unit Trusts which proved very popular with the market. Initially these products were focused at individual clients of the discount house as well as private portfolios of Kingdom Stockbroking. Aggressive marketing and awareness campaigns established the Kingdom Unit Trust as the most popular retail brand of the group. The Kingdom brand was thus born.

Acquisition of Discount Company of Zimbabwe (DCZ)

After a spurt of organic growth, the Kingdom entrepreneurs decided to hasten the growth rate synergistically. They set out to acquire the oldest discount house in the country and the world, The Discount Company of Zimbabwe, which was a listed entity. With this acquisition Kingdom would acquire critical competences as well as achieve the much coveted ZSE listing inexpensively through a reverse listing. Initial efforts at a negotiated merger with DCZ were rebuffed by its executives who could not countenance a forty year old institution being swallowed up by a four year old business. The entrepreneurs were not deterred. Nigel approached his friend Greg Brackenridge at Stanbic to finance and effect the acquisition of the sixty percent shares which were in the hands of about ten shareholders, on behalf of Kingdom Financial Holdings but to be placed in the ownership of Stanbic Nominees. This strategy masked the identity of the acquirer. Claud Chonzi, the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) GM and a friend to Lysias Sibanda (a Kingdom executive director), agreed to act as a front in the negotiations with the DCZ shareholders. NSSA is a well known institutional investor and hence these shareholders may have believed that they were dealing with an institutional investor. Once Kingdom controlled 60% of DCZ, it took over the company and reverse listed itself onto the Stock Exchange as Kingdom Financial Holdings Limited (KFHL). Because of the negative real interest rates, Kingdom successfully used debt finance to structure the acquisition. This acquisition and the subsequent listing gave the once despised young entrepreneurs confidence and credibility on the market.

Other Strategic Acquisitions

Within the same year Kingdom Merchant Bank acquired a strategic stake in CFX Bureau de Change owned by Sean Maloney as well as another stake in a greenfield microlending franchise, Pfihwa P/L. CFX was changed into KFX and used in most foreign currency trading activities. KFHL set as a strategic intention the acquisition of an additional 24.9% stake in CFX Holdings to safeguard the initial investment and ensure management control. This did not work out. Instead, Sean Maloney opted out and took over the failed Universal Merchant Bank licence to form CFX Merchant Bank. Although Kingdom executives contend that the alliance failed due to the abolition of bureau de change by government, it appears that Sean Maloney refused to give up control of the extra shareholding sought by Kingdom. It therefore would be reasonable that once Kingdom could not control KFX, a fall out ensued. The liquidation of this investment in 2002 resulted in a loss of Z$403 million on that investment. However this was manageable in light of the strong group profitability.

Pfihwa P/L financed the informal sector as a form of corporate social responsibility. However when the hyperinflationary environment and stringent regulatory environment encroached on the viability of the project, it was wound up in early 2004. Kingdom pursued its financing of the informal sector through MicroKing, which was established with international assistance. By 2002 MicroKing had eight branches located in the midst of, or near, micro-enterprise clusters.

In 2000, due to increased activity on the foreign currency front within the banking sector, Kingdom opened a private banking facility through the discount house to exploit revenue streams from this market. Following market trends, it engaged the insurance company AIG to enter the bancassurance market in 2003.

Meikles Strategic Alliance

In 1999 the entrepreneurial Chanakira on advice from his executives and the legendary corporate finance team from Barclays bank led by the affable Hugh Van Hoffen entered into a strategic alliance with Meikles Africa whereby it injected some Z$322 million into Kingdom for an equity shareholding of 25%. Interestingly, the deal nearly collapsed on pricing as Meikles only wanted to pay $250 million whilst KFHL valued themselves at Z$322 million which in real terms was the largest private sector deal done between an indigenous bank and a listed corporate. Nigel testifies that it was a walk through the incomplete Celebration Church site on the Saturday preceding the signing of the Meikles deal that led him to sign the deal which he saw as a means for him to sow a whopping seed into the church to boost the Building Fund. God was faithful! Kingdom’s share price shot up dramatically from $2,15 at the time he made the commitment to the Pastor all the way to $112,00 by the following October!

In return Kingdom acquired a powerful cash-rich shareholder that allowed it entrance into retail banking through an innovative in-store banking strategy. Meikles Africa opened its retail branches, namely TM Supermarkets, Clicks, Barbours, Medix Pharmacies and Greatermans, as distribution channels for Kingdom commercial bank or as account holders providing deposits and requiring banking services. This was a cheaper way of entering retail banking. It proved useful during the 2003 cash crisis because Meikles with its massive cash resources within its business units assisted Kingdom Bank, thus cushioning it from a liquidity crisis. The alliance also raised the reputation and credibility of Kingdom Bank and created an opportunity for Kingdom to finance Meikles Africa’s customers through the jointly owned Meikles Financial Services. Kingdom provided the funding for all lease and hire purchases from Meikles’ subsidiaries, thus driving sales for Meikles while providing easy lending opportunities for Kingdom. Meikles managed the relationship with the client.

Meikles Africa as a strategic shareholder assured Kingdom of success when recapitalisation was required and has enhanced Kingdom’s brand image. This strategic relationship has created powerful synergies for mutual benefit.

Commercial Banking

Exploiting the opportunities arising from the strategic relationship with Meikles Africa, Kingdom made its debut into retail banking in January 2001 with in-store branches at High Glen and Chitungwiza TM supermarkets. The target was principally the mass market. This rode on the strong brand Kingdom had created through the Unit Trusts. In-store banking offered low cost delivery channels with minimal investment in brick and mortar. By the end of 2001, thirteen branches were operational across the country. This followed a deliberate strategy for aggressive roll-out of the branches with two flagship branches ïEUR­ïEUR one in Bulawayo and the other in Harare. There was a huge emphasis on an IT driven strategy with significant cross-selling between the commercial bank and other SBUs.

However, it was further discovered that there was a market for the upmarket clients and hence Crown banking outlets were established to diversify the target market. In 2004, after closing three in-store branches in a rationalization exercise, there were 16 in-store branches and 9 Crown banking outlets.

The entrance into commercial banking was probably held at the wrong time, considering the imminent changes in the banking industry. Commercial banking does provide cheap deposits, however at the price of huge staff costs and human resource management complications. Nigel concedes that, with hindsight, this could have been delayed or done at a slower pace. However, the need for increased market share in a fiercely competitive industry necessitated this. Another reason for persisting with the commercial banking project was that of prior agreements with Meikles Africa. It is possible that Meikles Africa had been sold on the equity take-up deal on the back of promises to engage in in-store banking, which would increase revenue for its subsidiaries.

Innovative Products and Services

KFHL continued its aggressive pursuit of product innovation. After the failure of the KFX project, CurrencyKing was established to continue the work. However this was abolished in November 2002 by government ministerial intervention when bureau de change were prohibited in an effort to stamp out parallel market foreign currency trading.

Sadly this governmental decision was misguided for not only did it fail to banish foreign currency parallel trading but it drove underground, made it more lucrative and subsequently the government lost all control of the management of the exchange rate.

In October 2002, KFHL established Kingdom Leasing after being granted a finance house licence. Its mandate was to exploit opportunities to trade in financial leases, lease hire and short term financial products.

Regional Expansion

Around 2000 it became evident that the domestic market was highly competitive, with limited prospects of future growth. A decision was made to diversify revenue streams and reduce country risk through penetration into the regional markets. This strategy would exploit the proven competences in securities trading, asset management and corporate advisory services from a small capital base. Therefore the entrance had low risk in terms of capital injection. Considering the foreign exchange control limitations and shortage of foreign currency in Zimbabwe, this was a prudent strategy but not without its downside, as will be seen in the Botswana venture.

In 2001, KFHL acquired a 25.1% stake in a greenfield banking enterprise in Malawi, First Discount House Ltd. To safeguard its investment and ensure managerial control, an executive director and dealer were seconded to the Malawi venture while Nigel Chanakira chaired the Board. This investment has continued to grow and yield positive returns. As of July 2006 Kingdom had finally managed to up its stake from 25,1% to 40% in this investment and may ultimately control it to the point of seeking a conversion of the license to a commercial bank.

KFHL also took up a 25% equity stake in Investrust Merchant Bank Zambia. Franky Kufa was seconded to it as an executive director while Nigel took a seat on the Board.

KFHL had been promised an option to gain a controlling stake. However when the bank stabilized, the Zambian shareholders entered into some questionable transactions and were not prepared to allow KFHL to up it’s stake and so KFHL decided to pull out as relationships turned frosty. The Zambian Central Bank intervened with a promise to grant KFHL its own banking license. This did not materialize as the Zambian Central Bank exploited the banking crisis in Zimbabwe to deny KHFL a licence. A reasonable premium of Z$2.5 billion was obtained at disinvestment.

In Botswana, a subsidiary called Kingdom Bank Africa Ltd (KBAL) was established as an offshore bank in the International Finance Centre. KBAL was intended to spearhead and manage regional initiatives for Kingdom. It was headed by Mrs Irene Chamney, seconded by Lysias Sibanda with the concurrence of Nigel after managerial challenges in Zimbabwe. Two other senior executives were seconded there. She successfully set up the KBAL’s banking infrastructure and had good relations with the Botswana authorities.

However, the business model chosen of an offshore bank ahead of a domestic Botswana merchant bank license turned out to be the Achilles heel of the bank more so when the Zimbabwe banking crisis set in between 2003 and 2005. There were fundamental differences in how Mrs Chamney and Chanakira saw the bank surviving and going forward.

Ultimately, it was deemed prudent for Mrs. Chamney to leave the bank in 2005. In 2001 KFHL acquired the mandate as the sole distributor of the American Express card in the whole of Africa except for RSA. This was handled through KBAL. Kingdom Private Bank was transferred from the discount house to become a subsidiary of KBAL due to the prevailing regulatory environment in Zimbabwe.

In 2004 KBAL was temporarily placed under curatorship due to undercapitalisation. At this stage the parent company had regulatory constraints that prevented foreign currency capital injection.

A solution was found in the sourcing of local partners and the transfer of US$1 million previously realised from the proceeds of the Investrust liquidation to Botswana. Nigel Chanakira took a more active management role in KBAL because of its huge strategic significance to the future of KFHL. Currently efforts are underway to acquire a local commercial bank licence in Botswana as well. Once this is acquired there are two possible scenarios, namely maintaining both licences or giving up the offshore licence.

The interviewees were divided in their opinion on this. However in my view, judging from the stakeholder power involved, KFHL is likely to give up the off shore banking licence and use the local Kingdom Bank Botswana (Pula Bank) licence for regional and domestic expansion.

Human Resources

The staff complement grew from the initial 23 in 1995 to more than 947 by 2003. The growth was consistent with the growing institution. It exploded, especially during the launch and expansion of the commercial bank. Kingdom from inception had a strong human resourcing strategy which entailed significant training both internally and externally. Before the foreign currency crisis, employees were sent for training in such countries as RSA, Sweden, India and the USA. In the person of Faith Ntabeni Bhebhe, Kingdom had an energetic HR driver who created powerful HR systems for the emerging behemoth.

As a sign of its commitment to building the human resource capability, in 1998 Kingdom Financial Services entered a management agreement with Holland based AMSCO for the provision of seasoned bankers. Through this strategic alliance Kingdom strengthened its skills base and increased opportunities for skills transfer to locals. This helped the entrepreneurial bankers create a solid managerial system for the bank while the seasoned bankers from Holland compensated for the youthfulness of the emerging bankers. What a foresight!

In-house self-paced interactive learning, team building exercises and mentoring were all part of the learning menu targeted at developing the human resource capacity of the group. Work and job profiling was introduced to best match employees to suitable posts. Career path and succession planning were embraced. Kingdom was the first entrepreneurial bank to have smooth unforced CEO transitions. The founding CEO passed on the baton to Lysias Sibanda in 1999 as he stepped into the role of Group CEO and board deputy chair. His role was now to pursue and spearhead global and regional niche financial markets. A few years later there was another change of the guard as

Franky Kufa stepped in as Group CEO to replace Sibanda, who resigned on medical grounds. One could argue that these smooth transitions were due to the fact that the baton was passing to founding directors.

With the explosive growth in staff complement due to the commercial bank project, culture issues emerged. Consequently, KFHL engaged in an enculturation programme resulting in a culture revolution dubbed “Team Kingdom”. This culture had to be reinforced due to dilutions through significant mergers and acquisitions, significant staff turnover because of increased competition, emigration to greener pastures and the age profile of the staff increased the risk of high mobility and fraudulent activities in collusion with members of the public. Culture changes are difficult to effect and their effectiveness even harder to assess.

In 2004, with a high staff turnover of around 14%, a compensation strategy that ring fenced critical skills like IT and treasury was implemented. Due to the low margins and the financial stress experienced in 2004, KFHL lost more than 341 staff members due to retrenchment, natural attrition and emigration. This was acceptable as profitability fell while staff costs soared. At this stage, staff costs accounted for 58% of all expenses.

Despite the impressive growth, the financial performance when inflation adjusted was mediocre. Actually a loss position was reported in 2004. This growth was severely compromised by the hyperinflationary conditions and the restrictive regulatory environment.

Conclusion

This article shows the determination of entrepreneurs to push through to the realisation of their dreams despite significant odds. In a subsequent article we will tackle the challenges faced by Nigel Chanakira in solidifying his investments.

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The history of mergers and acquisitions in the United States is comprised of a series of five distinct waves of activity. Each wave occurred at a different time, and each exhibited some unique characteristics related to the nature of the activity, the sources of funding for the activity, and to some extent, differing levels of success from wave to wave. When the volume, nature, mechanisms, and outcomes of these transactions are viewed in an objective historical context, important lessons emerge.

 

The First Wave

The first substantial wave of merger and acquisition activity in the United States occurred between 1898 and 1904. The normal level of about 70 mergers per year leaped to 303 in 1898, and crested at 1,208 in 1899. It remained at more than 300 every year until 1903, when it dropped to 142, and dropped back again into what had been a range of normalcy for the period, with 79 mergers, in 1904. Industries comprising the bulk of activity during this first wave of acquisition and merger activity included primary metals, fabricated metal products, transportation equipment, machinery, petroleum products, bituminous coal, chemicals, and food products. By far, the greatest motivation for these actions was the expansion of the business into adjacent markets. In fact, 78% of the mergers and acquisitions occurring during this period resulted in horizontal expansion, and another 9.7% involved both horizontal and vertical integration.

 

During this era in American history, the business environment related to mergers and acquisitions was much less regulated and much more dynamic than it is today. There was very little by way of antitrust impediments, with few laws and even less enforcement. 

 

The Second Wave

The second wave of merger and acquisition activity in American businesses occurred between 1916 and 1929. Having become more concerned about the rampant growth of mergers and acquisitions during the first wave, the United States Congress was much more wary about such activities by the time the second wave rolled around. Business monopolies resulting from the first wave produced some market abuses, and a set of business practices that were viewed as unfair by the American public. Even the Sherman Act proved to be relatively ineffective as a deterrent of monopolistic practices, and so Congress passed another piece of legislation entitled the Clayton Act to reinforce the Sherman Act in 1914. The Clayton Act was somewhat more effective, and proved to be particularly useful to the Federal Government in the late 1900s. However, during this second wave of activity in the years spanning 1926 to 1930, a total of 4,600 mergers and acquisitions occurred. The industries with greatest concentrations of these activities included primary metals, petroleum products, chemicals, transportation equipment, and food products. The upshot of all of these consolidations was that 12,000 companies disappeared, and more than $13 billion in assets were acquired (17.5% of the country’s total manufacturing assets).

 

The nature of the businesses formed was somewhat different in the second wave; there was a higher incidence of mergers and acquisitions to achieve vertical integration in the second wave, and a much higher percentage of the resulting businesses resulted in conglomerates that included previously unrelated businesses.  The second wave of acquisition and merger activity in the United States ended in the stock market crash on October 29, 1929, and this altered – perhaps forever – the perspective of investment bankers related to funding these transactions. Companies that grew to prominence through the second wave of mergers and acquisitions in the United States, and that still operate in this country today, include General Motors, IBM, John Deere (now Deere & Company), and Union Carbide. 

The Third Wave

The American economy during the last half of the 1960s (1965 through 1970) was booming, and the growth of corporate mergers and acquisitions, especially related to conglomeration, was unprecedented. It was this economic boom that painted the backdrop for the third wave of mergers and acquisitions in American history. A peculiar feature of this period was the relatively common practice of companies targeting acquisitions that were larger than themselves. This period is sometimes referred to as the conglomerate merger period, owing in large measure to the fact that acquisitions of companies with over $100 million in assets spiked so dramatically. Compared to the years preceding the third wave, mergers and acquisitions of companies this size occurred far less frequently. Between 1948 and 1960, for example, they averaged 1.3 per year. Between 1967 and 1969, however, there were 75 of them – averaging 25 per year.  During the third wave, the FTC reports, 80% of the mergers that occurred were conglomerate transactions. 

 

Although the most recognized conglomerate names from this period were huge corporations such as Litton Industries, ITT and LTV, many small and medium size companies attempted to pursue an avenue of diversification. The diversification involved here included not only product lines, but also the industries in which these companies chose to participate. As a result, most of the companies involved in these activities moved substantially outside of what had been regarded as their core businesses, very often with deleterious results. 

 

It is important to understand the difference between a diversified company, which is a company with some subsidiaries in other industries, but a majority of its production or services within one industry category, and a conglomerate, which conducts its business in multiple industries, without any real adherence to a single primary industry base. Boeing, which primarily produces aircraft and missiles, has diversified by moving into areas such as Exostar, an online exchange for Aerospace & Defense companies. However, ITT has conglomerated, with industry leadership positions in electronic components, defense electronics & services, fluid technology, and motion & flow control. While the bulk of companies merged or acquired in the long string of activity resulting in the current Boeing Company were almost all aerospace & defense companies, the acquisitions of ITT were far more diverse. In fact, just since becoming an independent company in 1995, ITT has acquired Goulds Pumps, Kaman Sciences, Stanford Telecom and C&K Components, among other companies.

 

Since the ascension of the third wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1960s, there has been a great deal of pressure from stockholders for company growth. With the only comparatively easy path to that growth being the path of conglomeration, a lot of companies pursued it. That pursuit was funded differently in this third wave of activity, however. It was not financed by the investment bankers that had sponsored the two previous events. With the economy in expansion, interest rates were comparatively high and the criteria for obtaining credit also became more demanding. This wave of merger and acquisition activity, then, was executed by the issuance of stock. Financing the activities through the use of stock avoided tax liability in some cases, and the resulting acquisition pushed up earnings per share even though the acquiring company was paying a premium for the stock of the acquired firm, using its own stock as the currency.

The use of this mechanism to boost EPS, however, becomes unsustainable as larger and larger companies are involved, because the underlying assumption in the application of this mechanism is that the P/E ratio of the (larger) acquiring company will transfer to the entire base of stock of the newly combined enterprise. Larger acquisitions represent larger percentages of the combined enterprise, and the market is generally less willing to give the new enterprise the benefit of that doubt. Eventually, when a large number of merger and acquisition activities occur that are founded on this mechanism, the pool of suitable acquisition candidates is depleted, and the activity declines. That decline is largely responsible for the end of the third wave of merger and acquisition activity. 

One other mechanism that was used in a similar way, and with a similar result, in the third wave or merger and acquisition activity was the issue of convertible debentures (debt securities that are convertible into common stock), in order to gather in the earnings of the acquired firm without being required to reflect an increase in the number of shares of common stock outstanding. The resulting bump in visible EPS was known as the bootstrap effect. Over the course of my own career, I have often heard of similar tactics referred to as “creative accounting”. 

 

Almost certainly, the most conclusive evidence that the bulk of conglomeration activity achieved through mergers and acquisitions is harmful to overall company value is the fact that so many of them are later sold or divested. For example, more than 60% of cross-industry acquisitions that occurred between 1970 and 1982 were sold or divested in some other manner by 1989. The widespread failure of most conglomerations has certainly been partly the result of overpaying for acquired companies, but the fact is that overpaying is the unfortunate practice of many companies. In one recent interview I conducted with an extremely successful CEO in the healthcare industry, I asked him what actions he would most strongly recommend that others avoid when entering into a merger or acquisition. His response was immediate and emphatic: “Don’t become enamored with the acquisition target”, he replied. ”Otherwise you will overpay. The acquisition has to make sense on several levels, including price.” 

 

The failure of conglomeration, then, springs largely from another root cause. Based on my own experience and the research I have conducted, I am reasonably certain that the most fundamental cause is the nature of conglomeration management. Implicit in the management of conglomerates is the notion that management can be done well in the absence of specialized industry knowledge, and that just isn’t usually the case. Regardless of the “professional management” business curricula offered by many institutions of higher learning these days, in most cases there is just no substitute for industry-specific experience. 

            

The Fourth Wave

The first indications that a fourth wave of merger and acquisition activity was imminent appeared in 1981, with a near doubling of the value of these transactions from the prior year. However, the surge receded a bit, and really regained serious momentum again in 1984.   According to Mergerstat Review (2001), just over $44 billion was paid in merger and acquisition transactions in 1980 (representing 1,889 transactions), compared to more than $82 billion (representing 2,395 transactions) in 1981. While activity fell back to between $50 billion and $75 billion in the ensuing two years, the 1984 activity represented over $122 billion and 2,543 transactions. In terms of peaks, the number of transactions peaked in 1986 at 3,336 transactions, and the dollar volume peaked in 1988 at more than $246 billion. The entire wave of activity, then, is regarded by analysts to have occurred between 1981 and 1990. 

 

There are a number of aspects of this fourth wave that distinguish it from prior activities. The first of those characteristics is the advent of the hostile takeover. While hostile takeovers have been around since the early 1900s, they truly proliferated (more in terms of dollars than in terms of percent of transactions) during this fourth wave of merger and acquisition activity. In 1989, for example, more than three times as many dollars were transacted as a result of contested tender offers than the dollars associated with uncontested offers. Some of this phenomenon was closely tied to another characteristic of the fourth wave of activity; the sheer size and industry prominence of acquisition targets during that period. Referring again to Mergerstat Review’s numbers published in 2001, the average purchase price paid in merger and acquisition transactions in 1970, for example, was $9.8 million. By 1975, it had grown to $13.9 million, and by 1980 it was $49.8 million. At its peak in 1988, the average purchase price paid in mergers and acquisitions was $215.1 million.   Exacerbating the situation was the volume of large transactions. The number of transactions valued at more than $100 million increased by more than 23 times between 1974 and 1986, which was a stark contrast to the typically small-to-medium size company based activities of the 1960s.

 

Another factor that impacted this fourth wave of merger and acquisition activity in the United States was the advent of deregulation. Industries such as banking and petroleum were directly affected, as was the airline industry.   Between 1981 and 1989, five of the ten largest acquisitions involved a company in the petroleum industry – as an acquirer, an acquisition, or both. These included the 1984 acquisition of Gulf Oil by Chevron ($13.3 billion), the acquisition in that same year of Getty Oil by Texaco ($10.1 billion), the acquisition of Standard Oil of Ohio by British Petroleum in 1987 ($7.8 billion), and the acquisition of Marathon Oil by US Steel in 1981 ($6.6 billion).  Increased competition in the airline industry resulted in a severe deterioration in the financial performance of some carriers, as the airline industry became deregulated and air fares became exposed to competitive pricing.

 

An additional look at the ontology of the ten largest acquisitions between 1981 and 1989 reflects that relatively few of them were acquisitions that extended the acquiring company’s business into other industries than their core business. For example, among the five oil-related acquisitions, only two of them (DuPont’s acquisition of Conoco and US Steel’s acquisition of Marathon Oil) were out-of-industry expansions. Even in these cases, one might argue that they are “adjacent industry” expansions. Other acquisitions among the top ten were Bristol Meyers’ $12.5 billion acquisition of Squibb (same industry – Pharmaceuticals), and Campeau’s $6.5 billion acquisition of Federated Stores (same industry – Retail). 

 

The final noteworthy aspect of the “top 10″ list from our fourth wave of acquisitions is the characteristic that is exemplified by the actions of Kohlberg Kravis. Kohlberg Kravis performed two of these ten acquisitions (both the largest – RJR Nabisco for $5.1 billion, and Beatrice for $6.2 billion). Kohlberg Kravis was representative of what came to be known during the fourth wave as the “corporate raider”. Corporate raiders such as Paul Bilzerian, who eventually acquired the Singer Corporation in 1988 after participating in numerous previous “raids”, made fortunes for themselves by attempting corporate takeovers. Oddly, the takeovers did not have to be ultimately successful for the raider to profit from it; they merely had to drive up the price of shares they acquired as a part of the takeover attempt. In many cases, the raiders were actually paid off (this was called “greenmail”) with corporate assets in exchange for the stock they had acquired in the attempted takeover. 

 

Another term that came into the lexicon of the business community during this fourth wave of acquisition and merger activity is the leveraged buy-out, or LBO. Kohlberg Kravis helped develop and popularize the LBO concept by creating a series of limited partnerships to acquire various corporations, which they deemed to be underperforming. In most cases, Kohlberg Kravis financed up to ten percent of the acquisition price with its own capital and borrowed the remainder through bank loans and by issuing high-yield bonds. Usually, the target company’s management was allowed to retain an equity interest, in order to provide a financial incentive for them to approve of the takeover.

 

The bank loans and bonds used the tangible and intangible assets of the target company as collateral. Because the bondholders only received their interest and principal payments after the banks were repaid, these bonds were riskier than investment grade bonds in the event of default or bankruptcy. As a result, these instruments became known as “junk bonds.” Investment banks such as Drexel Burnham Lambert, led by Michael Milken, helped raise money for leveraged buyouts. Following the acquisition, Kohlberg Kravis would help restructure the company, sell off underperforming assets, and implement cost-cutting measures. After achieving these efficiencies, the company was usually then resold at a significant profit.

 

Increasingly, as one reviews the waves of acquisition and merger activity that have occurred in the United States, this much seems clear: While it is possible to profit from the creative use of financial instruments and from the clever buying and selling of companies managed as an investment portfolio, the real and sustainable growth in company value that is available through acquisitions and mergers comes from improving the newly formed enterprise’s overall operating efficiency. Sustainable growth results from leveraging enterprise-wide assets after the merger or acquisition has occurred. That improvement in asset efficiency and leverage is most frequently achieved when management has a fundamental commitment to the ultimate success of the business, and is not motivated purely by a quick, temporary escalation in stock price. This is related, in my view, to the earlier observation that some industry-specific knowledge improves the likelihood of success as a new business is acquired. People who are committed to the long-term success of a company tend to pay more attention to the details of their business, and to broader scope of technologies and trends within their industry.  

 

There were a few other characteristics of the fourth wave of merger and acquisition activity that should be mentioned before moving on. First of all, the fourth wave saw the first significant effort by investment bankers and management consultants of various types to provide advice to acquisition and merger candidates, in order to earn professional fees. In the case of the investment bankers, there was an additional opportunity around financing these transactions. This opportunity gave rise, in large measure, to the junk bond market that raised capital for acquisitions and raids. Secondly, the nature of the acquisition – and especially the nature of takeovers – became more intricate and strategic in nature. Both the takeover mechanisms and paths and the defensive, anti-takeover methods and tools (eg: the “poison pill”) became increasingly sophisticated during the fourth wave. 

 

The third characteristic in this category of “other unique characteristics” in the fourth wave was the increased reliance on the part of acquiring companies on debt, and perhaps even more importantly, on large amounts of debt, to finance the acquisition. A significant rise in management team acquisition of their own firms using comparatively large quantities of debt gave rise to a new term – the leveraged buy-out (or LBO) – in the lexicon of the Wall Street analyst. 

 

The fourth characteristic was the advent of the international acquisition. Certainly, the acquisition of Standard Oil by British Petroleum for $7.8 billion in 1987 marked a change in the American business landscape, signaling a widening of the merger and acquisition landscape to encompass foreign buyers and foreign acquisition targets. This deal is significant not only because it involved foreign ownership of what had been considered a bedrock American company, but also because of the sheer dollar volume involved. A number of factors were involved in this event, such as the fall of the US dollar against foreign currencies (making US investments more attractive), and the evolution of the global marketplace where goods and services had become increasingly multinational in scope. 

 

The Fifth Wave

The fifth wave of acquisition and merger activity began immediately following the American economic recession of 1991 and 1992. The fifth wave is viewed by some observers as still ongoing, with the obvious interruption surrounding the tragic events September 11, 2001, and the recovery period immediately following those events. Others would say that it ended there, and after the couple of years ensuing, we are seeing the imminent rise of a sixth wave. Having no strong bias toward either view, for purposes of our discussion here I will adopt the first position. Based on the value of transactions announced over the course of the respective calendar years, the dollar volume of total mergers and acquisitions in the US in 1993 was $347.7 billion (an increase from $216.9 billion in 2002), continued to grow steadily to $734.6 billion in 1995, and expanded still further to $2,073.2 billion by 2000.    

 

This group of deals differed from the previous waves in several respects, but arguably the most important difference was that the acquisitions and mergers of the 1990s were more thoughtfully orchestrated than in any previous foray. They were more strategic in nature, and better aligned with what appeared to be relatively sophisticated strategic planning on the part of the acquiring company. This characteristic seems to have solidified as a primary feature of major merger and acquisition activity, at least in the US, which is encouraging for shareholders looking for sustainable growth rather than a quick – but temporary – bump in share price. 

 

A second characteristic of the fifth wave of acquisitions and mergers is that they were typically more equity-based than debt-based in terms of their funding. In many cases, this worked out well because it relied less on leverage that required near-term repayment, enabling the new enterprise to be more careful and deliberate about the sell-off of assets in order to service debt created by the acquisition.  

 

Even in cases where both of these features were prominent aspects of the deal, however, not all have been successful. In fact, some of the biggest acquisitions have been the biggest disappointments over recent years. For example, just before the announcement of the acquisition of Time Warner by AOL, a share of AOL common stock traded for about $94. In January of 2005, that share of stock was worth about $17.50. In the Spring of 2003, the average share price was more like $11.50. The AOL Time Warner merger was financed with AOL stock, and when the expected synergies did not materialize, market capitalization and shareholder value both tanked. What was not foreseen was the devaluation of the AOL shares used to finance the purchase. As analyst Frank Pellegrini reported in Time’s on-line edition on April 25, 2002: “Sticking out of AOL Time Warner’s rather humdrum earnings report Wednesday was a very gaudy number: A one-time loss of $54 billion. It’s the largest spill of red ink, dollar for dollar, in U.S. corporate history and nearly two-thirds of the company’s current stock-market value.” 

The fifth wave has also become known as the wave of the “roll-up”. A roll-up is a process that consolidates a fragmented industry through a series of acquisitions by comparatively large companies (typically already within that industry) called consolidators. While the most widely recognized of these roll-ups occurred in the funeral industry, office products retailers, and floral products, there were roll-ups of significant magnitude in other industries such as discrete segments of the aerospace & defense community. 

 

Finally, the fifth wave of acquisitions and mergers was the first one in which a very large percentage of the total global activity occurred outside of the United States. In 1990, the volume of transactions in the US was $301.3 billion, while the UK had $99.3 billion, Canada had $25.3 billion, and Japan represented $14.2 billion. By the year 2000, the tide was shifting. While the US still led with $2,073 billion, the UK had escalated to $473.7 billion, Canada had grown to $230.2 billion, and Japan had reached $108.8 billion. By 2005, it was clear that participation in global merger and acquisition activity was now anyone’s turf. According to barternews.com: “There was incredible growth globally in the M&A arena last year, with record-setting volume of $474.3 billion coming from the Asian-Pacific region, up 46% from $324.5 billion in 2004. In the U.S., M&A volume rose 30% from $886.2 billion in 2004. In Europe the figure was 49% higher than the $729.5 billion in 2004. Activity in Eastern Europe nearly doubled to a record $117.4 billion.” 

 

The Lessons of History

Many studies have been conducted that focus on historical mergers and acquisitions, and a great deal has been published on this topic. Most of the focus of these studies has been on more contemporary transactions, probably owing to factors such as the availability of detailed information, and a presumed increase in the relevance of more recent activity. However, before sifting through the collective wisdom of the legion of more contemporary studies, I think it’s important to look at least briefly to the patterns of history that are reflected earlier in this article.

 

Casting a view backward over this long history of mergers and acquisitions then, observing the relative successes and failures, and the distinctive characteristics of each wave of activity, what lessons can be learned that could improve the chances of success in future M&A activity?  Here are ten of my own observations:

Silver bullets and statistics. The successes and failures that we have reviewed through the course of this chapter reveal that virtually any type of merger or acquisition is subject to incompetence of execution, and to ultimate failure. There is no combination of market segments, management approaches, financial backing, or environmental factors that can guarantee success. While there is no “silver bullet” that can guarantee success, there are approaches, tools, and circumstances that serve to heighten or diminish the statistical probability of achieving sustainable long-term growth through an acquisition or merger.
The ACL Life Cycle is fundamental. The companies who achieve sustainable growth using acquisitions and mergers as a mainstay of their business strategy are those that move deliberately through the Acquisition / Commonization / Leverage (ACL) Life Cycle. We saw evidence of that activity in the case of US Steel, Allied Chemical, and others over the course of this review.
Integration failure often spells disaster. Failure to achieve enterprise-wide leverage through the commonization of fundamental business processes and their supporting systems can leave even the largest and most established companies vulnerable to defeat in the marketplace over time. We saw a number of examples of this situation, with the American Sugar Refining Company perhaps the most representative of the group.
Environmental factors are critical. As we saw in our review of the first wave, factors such as the emergence of a robust transportation system and strong, resilient manufacturing processes enabled the success of many industrial mergers and acquisitions. So it was more recently with the advent of information systems and the Internet. Effective strategic planning in general, and effective due diligence specifically, should always include a thorough understanding of the business environment and market trends. Often times, acquiring executives become enamored with the acquisition target (as mentioned in our review of third wave activity), and ignore contextual issues as well as fundamental business issues that should be warning signs.
Conglomeration is challenging. There were repeated examples of the challenges associated with conglomeration in our review of the history of mergers and acquisitions in the United States. While it is possible to survive – and even thrive – as a conglomerate, the odds are substantially against it. Those acquisitions and mergers that most often succeed in achieving sustainable long-term growth are the ones involving management with significant industry-specific and process-specific expertise. Remember the observation, during the course of our review of fourth wave activity, that “the most conclusive evidence that the bulk of conglomeration activity achieved through mergers and acquisitions is harmful to overall company value is the fact that so many of them are later sold or divested.”
Commonality holds value. Achieving significant commonality in fundamental business processes and the information systems that support them offers an opportunity for genuine synergy, and erects a substantive barrier against competitive forces in the marketplace. We saw this a number of times; Allied Chemical is especially illustrative. 
Objectivity is important. As we saw in our review of the influence of investment bankers vetoing questionable deals during second wave activities, there is considerable value in the counsel of objective outsiders. A well-suited advisor will not only bring a clear head and fresh eyes to the table, but will often introduce important evaluative expertise as a result of experience with other similar transactions, both inside and outside of the industry involved.
Clarity is critical. We saw the importance of clarity around the expected impacts of business decisions in our review of the application of the DuPont Model and similar tools that enabled the ascension of General Motors. Applying similar methods and tools can provide valuable insights about what financial results may be expected as the result of proposed acquisition or merger transactions.
Creative accounting is a mirage. The kind of creative accounting described by another author as “finance gimmickry” in our review of third wave activity does not generate sustainable value in the enterprise, and in fact, can prove devastating to companies who use it as a basis for their merger or acquisition activity.
Prudence is important when selecting financial instruments to fund M&A transactions. We observed a number of cases where inflated stock values, high-interest debt instruments, and other questionable choices resulted in tremendous devaluation in the resulting enterprise. Perhaps the most illustrative example was the recent AOL Time Warner merger described in the review of fifth wave activity.

Many of these lessons from history are closely related, and tend to reinforce one another. Together, they provide an important framework of understanding about what types of acquisitions and mergers are most likely to succeed, what methods and tools are likely to be most useful, and what actions are most likely to diminish the company’s capability for sustainable growth following the M&A transaction.

Big Canoe Awning Deck Inventory Warehousing

Mutual funds (MF), a major option of investment has many types. Each type is designed to satisfy specific requirements of investors. However, one need of investors stays same for all, returns on the investment. No one will like to opt for a fund that doesn’t offer higher returns. Now the question is how to spot high yield MF. To spot high yields, it is important to understand what high yield is with respect to funds. For example, investors is buying share of fund at price of $100 in year 2010. At the end of the 2011, if price of that same mutual fund share rises to $110 the yield will be 10% because it rose from $100 to $110 in a year.

Initial steps

Higher yields are always good for investors because returns on investment go high with higher yields. Yields of MF hugely depend on securities, stocks, and bonds included in the funds. It will be foolish to say that there is no risk when money is invested in funds. Risks might be fewer but they do exist. Sometimes it happens that with higher yield probability come higher risk and eventually investors have to lose part of their capital. This is not a good strategy by any stretch of imagination. Yields and risks must be nicely balanced for balanced portfolio. Rate of returns is different for all the funds. Rates are offered per year or three years or five years or ten years. It’s true that bigger the better but what if particular fund performs well this year and under perform for next few years. It won’t help investors by any means.

Therefore, look for funds that are performing well for last few years.

Factors that affect top mutual funds

One factor that can work quite negatively is the performance of individual stocks in the portfolio. Diversification can help if one or two stocks from the fund portfolio under perform but what if most of the stocks don’t perform as expected. MF will surely perform poorly then. It means that investors should be aware about the stocks included in funds to attract higher yields.
Inexperienced fund manager can be another reason because it all depends on component stocks. If fund manager doesn’t do enough research and hurry in selecting the stocks, investor will struggle more often than not. – Market timing is also factor. This is correlated to second reason described above. No one other than fund manager has better idea about market timing, whether it is risky or good. If he/she buy and sell stocks in the wrong time then the fund will perform badly.
Never forget to take into consideration fees and expenses applied on funds. If costs of mutual fund are high then it will directly affect yields. Most advantageous way to go is to select a fund that has lower expenses and doesn’t have loads.

Identifying Strong Stock and Bond Funds

There are two possible ways to expect high yields on mutual funds. First one is to invest in funds and hoping for the best. And second is to select top funds and secure higher yields. All won’t be lucky enough to make money first way so better to use second way, not unreasonable by any means. Go through prospectuses, profiles, and financial statements of all the MF shortlisted according to your research and find out fund that is performing well over the years (at least 5 years) and also have potential to perform same way. One can also consult financial planner if required because professional can carry out the calculations to find best mutual funds to invest.

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